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European Integration and Transnational 
Litigation 
Patrick Thieffry* 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. business community and public have now been thor-
oughly informed of the" 1992 Program" (i.e. the White Paper on 
Completing the Internal Market l and the Single European Act2 
(SEA» designed to achieve a Single European Market by the end 
of the year 1992. In most areas, the achievements of the next two 
and a half years are nothing more than a step towards that single 
market as the founders envisioned and as set forth in the original 
treaties. 3 As the European Community progresses rapidly to-
wards a common market, changes, some of which were not con-
templated by the White Paper or the SEA, will result in significant 
developments in legal practice, and in a unique framework for 
the resolution of international disputes. 
Some of the most visible innovations involve the structure of 
the European legal community. The merger of different legal 
professions, such as French avocats and conseils juridiques, and 
British barristers and solicitors, is considered an increasingly nec-
essary modernization in view of competition between lawyers in 
* Mr. Thieffry is a resident partner in the New York office of the French law firm 
Thieffry & Associes. He is a member of the Paris, New York and Georgia bars and is the 
author of numerous articles and a book on international dispute resolutions. The author 
acknowledges the assistance of Philip Van Doorn, a member of the Brussels Bar associated 
with the Brussels office of Thieffry & Associes; Simon w. Lowe, a Barrister, and Karin 
Brigitte Arnold, a Rechtsanwaltin, associated with the Paris office of Thieffry & Associes; 
and Peter E. Nahmias, an Attorney-at-law (N.Y. & NJ), associated with the New York 
office of Thieffry & Associes. 
I Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, COM(85) 310 final; 2 INT'L QUARTERLY 97 (1990). 
2 Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986,29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987) 
[hereinafter SEA]. 
3 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter EURATOM]. 
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the member states. The British legal community seems unpre-
pared and unwilling to accept such a change, but its French 
counterpart now appears ready for the necessary adjustments. 4 
These changes in the legal communities' structure began long 
before the 1992 program. Since 1977, lawyers admitted to prac-
tice in one member state have been able to appear in court and 
establish practices in any other member state. In that year, the 
European Court of Justice (Court of Justice) issued its landmark 
ruling that a Belgian lawyer who sought admission to the Paris 
bar could not be refused admission on the basis of citizenship, 
and his qualifications had to be recognized throughout the Com-
munity.5 More recently, an unprecedented number of firms have 
undertaken discussions with the declared intent to establish some 
kind of relationship among themselves, either within a member 
state or between different countries, in a sometimes slightly ir-
rational attempt to deal with the emerging Single European Mar-
ket. 
The increased liberalization of legal practice, however, has not 
been extended to U.S. lawyers in the Community. U.S. lawyers 
practicing in Europe are not permitted to appear in most member 
state courts regardless of their established practice in that mem-
ber state. Appearance in member state courts depends on bar 
membership, which remains limited to member state citizens in 
most member states. 
In addition, Community institutions deny U.S. lawyers the 
equivalent of the attorney-client privilege because U.S. lawyers 
are generally not admitted to any member state bar. As a result, 
opinions given by U.S. lawyers in Europe on agreements or prac-
tices that may be in restraint of trade or otherwise unlawful, as 
well as communications from their clients upon which the opin-
ions were based, may be seized by the Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities (Commission).6 
4 New Plan, Jolts to the British Legal Profession, N.V. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, at AI, col. 
1. 
5 Thieffry v. Conseil de I'Ordre des Avocats a Paris, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 765, 
20 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 373 (1977). 
6 The denial of the attorney-client privilege is based on the European Court of Justice's 
(Court of Justice) ruling in AM & S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. 
Rep. 1575. The Commission has disagreed with the ruling, fearing for the interests of 
European Community lawyers operating beyond the Community, and has called for 
negotiations with third countries as to reciprocal recognition of privileges. See Council 
Decision of 9 October 1984 Concerning the Protection of Legal Papers in Connection 
With the Application of Rules on Competition, COM(84) 548. 
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The 1992 program will represent hundreds of items of Com-
munity legislation which will generally come in the form of reg-
ulations,7 with direct effect in member states, and directives,8 with 
either direct or indirect effect in member states. The characteri-
zation of directives as having either direct or indirect effect will 
have significant impact on potential litigation surrounding the 
1992 program. Besides the enforcement of new Community leg-
islation and its interpretation, significant litigation may thus be 
expected with respect to its implementation.9 Because of the dis-
similar nature of regulations and directives and their very diverse 
subject matters, the types of remedies generated by the new 
substantive provisions will vary as demonstrated by a few exam-
ples. 
The most recent and significant development to date, Regula-
tion 4064/89 10 (Merger Control Regulation), addresses competi-
tion law, the very core of the integration process as envisioned in 
the original treaties. Starting September 1, 1990, the Commission 
must be notified of all acquisitions of shares, assets, or even 
contract rights which make it possible for one company to deter-
mine how another shall operate, provided they meet certain size 
thresholds. 
The notification must be made before a merger or joint venture 
agreement goes into effect. 11 Within four weeks of the notifica-
tion, the Commission will decide whether the merger meets the 
size requirements l2 and whether it intends to commence an in-
vestigation. 13 The regulation grants the Commission four months 
to make its determination as to whether the merger would or 
7 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 189(2). Article 189(2) states: "A regulation shall have 
general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member 
States." 
BId. Article 189(3) states: "A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, 
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities 
the choice of form and methods." 
9 Thieffry, Van Doorn & Lowe, Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation, Practice 
and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374,25 TORTS & INS. L.]. 65, 83 (1989) 
[hereinafter Strict Product Liability]. 
IO Regulation 4064/89, Council Regulation of 21 December 1989 on the Control of 
Concentrations Between Undertakings, 32 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989) [here-
inafter Merger Control Regulation]. See also Modified Proposal for a Regulation on the 
Control of Mergers, COM(88) 734; Thieffry, The New EC Merger Control Regulation, _ 
INT'L LAW. __ (1990). 
II Merger Control Regulation, supra note 10, at art. 10. 
12Id. 
"Id. 
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would not have the effect of "creating or strengthening a domi-
nant position" as a result of which competition would be signifi-
cantly impeded. 14 
Undoubtedly, a number of procedural issues will arise in the 
very near future in connection with the Merger Control Regu-
lation due to both the economic importance of the phenomenon 
and the unavoidable sophistication of the process. Litigation will 
most likely be initiated by companies seeking the cancellation of 
decisions l5 or regulations l6 addressed to them or having "direct 
and individual concern" to them. To contest such decisions and 
regulations, companies may rely on articles 173 and 184 of the 
EEC Treaty which will grant private litigants standing to chal-
lenge Community legislation on the several grounds that the 
Community institution lacks competence, infringed an essential 
procedural requirement, or misused its powersY In addition, as 
the new Merger Control Regulation was obviously unable to mod-
ify articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (the pre-existing com-
petition law provisions), private parties will seek to use them even 
where the Commission rules on the basis of the merger regula-
tion. For example, hostile takeover targets will most likely seek 
injunctions from member state courts on the basis of the anti-
monopolization provision of article 86. 
In this respect, the new Proposed Takeover Directivel8 ad-
dresses the disparities in member state legislation pertinent to 
takeover strategies and defensive tactics that create distortions in 
competition. Once it is incorporated in the member states' legis-
lations, it will restrict companies' ability to benefit from their 
home countries' favorable environments and simultaneously ac-
[d. 
14 [d. at arts. 10, 22. 
15 See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 173(2). Article 173(2) states: 
Any natural or legal person may [on grounds of lack of competence, infringe-
ment of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application, or misuse of 
powers) institute proceedings against a decision addressed to that person or 
against a decision which, although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the former. 
16 See id. at art. 184. Article 184 states: "[A)ny party may, in proceedings in which a 
regulation of the Councilor of the Commission is in issue, plead the grounds specified 
in ... Article 173, in order to invoke before the Court of Justice the inapplicability of 
that regulation." [d. 
17 [d. 
18 Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive of 19 January 1989 on Company Law 
Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, COM(88) 823 final, 32 0.]. EUR. COMM. 
(No. C 64) 8 (1989) [hereinafter Proposed Takeover Directive). 
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quire dominant power over unprotected competitors in other 
member states. 19 Interested parties will then be able to seek pre-
liminary rulings from the Court of Justice as to the proper inter-
pretation of the directive.20 
The underlying rationale for harmonizing member states' tax 
legislation during the first decades of the Community was also to 
suppress distortions in competition. Such a competition-oriented 
approach to the Community's tax structures is no longer sufficient 
in view of ambitious goals such as European Monetary Union 
(EMU).21 EMU may only be achieved by narrowing the gap be-
tween the member states' taxation of individual and business 
incomes. The comparatively less ambitious implementation of the 
VAT system has generated tremendous litigation between the 
Commission or private parties, on the one hand, and member 
states accused of not implementing the Community policy, on the 
other.22 Recurring litigation has centered around member state 
tax schemes which allegedly ought to have been characterized as 
sales taxes and abolished because the VAT preempts all such 
levies. It is difficult to imagine how the numerous reforms re-
quired for EMU could be achieved without comparably complex 
litigation. 
The span of reforms undertaken in pursuit of a Single Euro-
pean Market is extremely broad and potentially touches upon all 
aspects of member state legislation affecting businesses. "Differ-
ences in national laws ... [which] substantially adversely affect 
the conditions of ... competition ... and trade in goods between 
Member States" have, for instance, warranted the adoption of 
Directive 86/653 (Commercial Agency Directive) which coordi-
nates member state laws relating to self-employed commercial 
19 [d. at art. 1. 
20 See EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177. Article 177 permits member states' courts 
or tribunals to bring questions regarding decisions for which "there is no judicial remedy 
under national law" before the Court of Justice. Member states' courts or tribunals may 
request preliminary rulings from the Court of Justice concerning the "interpretation" or 
"validity" of community legislation. [d. 
21 For an overview of European Monetary Union, see Economic and Commercial Policy, 
2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~ 3601. The Council hopes to "constitute a zone in which 
persons, goods, services, and capital will move freely," to "form an individual monetary 
unit within the international system," and to "hold the powers and responsibilities in the 
economic and monetary field enabling its institutions to organize the administration of 
the union." [d. 
22 [d. 
344 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XIII, No.2 
agents. 23 One of its main provisions is that termination of the 
agent for circumstances other than those attributable to the prin-
cipal, such as the agent's age, infirmity, illness, or assignment of 
the contract, shall entitle the latter to indemnity for either having 
generated new customers or a significant increase in sales.24 In 
light of some member state and U.S. experience,25 it is not diffi-
cult to predict a wave of litigation when the directive comes into 
force. Law suits similar to those brought in the United States by 
terminated franchises will be brought before member state courts, 
and interpretation of the directive's provisions will be obtainable 
from the Court of Justice, as in the case of the Proposed Takeover 
Directive.26 
A U.S. manufacturer exporting to the Community will also 
have to bear in mind the strict product liability system adopted 
by Directive 85/374 (Product Liability Directive).27 As a conse-
quence, all member states are required to adopt statutes incor-
porating the new system into their national laws. When the Prod-
uct Liability Directive is implemented, the manufacturer, seller, 
or importer of defective products within the Community may be 
held strictly liable for both personal (bodily injury or death) and 
property damage. 
The Commission's Proposed Product Safety Directive28 has in-
direct relevance to product liability standards, yet remains of the 
23 Directive 86/653, Council Directive of 18 December 1986 on the Coordination of the 
Laws of the Member States Relating to Self-employed Commercial Agents, 29 OJ. EUR. 
COMM. (No. L 382) 17 (1986) [hereinafter Commercial Agency Directive]. 
24Id. at arts. 17-18. 
25 France, for example, has had a regulation providing for damages in case of termi-
nation of commercial agents by their principals for many years. Commercial Agent, Decree 
No. 58-1345 of 23 December 1958. 
26 Independent dealers and technology licensees have also sought protection against 
termination. Not unlike the situation in the United States, they have done so on anti-trust 
principles as specified in the EEC Treaty under articles 85 and 86. It is significant that 
provisions dealing with this issue have been incorporated into the regulations providing 
a block exemption from the application of article 85 to automobile distributorships and 
service establishments. See Regulation 123/85, Council Regulation of December 21, 1984 
on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Motor Vehicle 
Distribution and Servicing Agreements, 0.]. Eur. Comm. (No. L 15) 16 (1985); Comm. 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~2751. 
27 Directive 85/374, Council Directive of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Lia-
bility for Defective Products, 28 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 210) 29 (1985) [hereinafter 
Product Liability Directive]. See Strict Product Liability, supra note 9, at 65. 
28 Proposal for a Council Directive of 27 April 1989 Concerning General Product Safety, 
COM(89) 162 final, 32 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 193) 1 (1989). 
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utmost importance. If adopted, the Proposed Safety Directive 
mandates that member states, and under certain circumstances 
the Commission, take all steps they deem necessary to ensure that 
products put in circulation in the Single European Market are 
safe. Some provisions of the Proposed Product Safety Directive 
appear quite innovative, such as that granting immunity from 
legal action to any person who publicly questions the safety of a 
product with the sole purpose of increasing public awareness.29 
The Proposed Product Safety Directive also provides that mere 
conformity to applicable technical regulations, norms, and stan-
dards is only a rebuttable presumption of the product's safety. 
Likewise, the only valid legal defense is if the defect unavoidably 
results from conformity with mandatory technical standards.30 
For a number of years, the Commission attempted to coordi-
nate national standards only to discover that the more directives 
it adopted for this purpose, the more national standards were 
promulgated. Coordination almost seemed to impair rather than 
facilitate the free movement of goods as a fundamental Com-
munity goal. An example of the kind of litigation produced by 
the European integration is the Court of Justice's ruling in Cassis 
de Dijon31 that products legally produced and sold in one member 
state that conform to that member state's standards are to be 
accepted by all other member states as if in conformity with their 
standards. Subsequently, the Commission's task has been limited 
to setting mandatory but essential norms leaving the adoption of 
specific standards to competent bodies, such as the European 
Normalization Committee and the standardization organizations 
of the individual member states. 
Although significantly less developed than in the United States, 
environmental liability could also become a major area of Com-
munity litigation. The Community first adopted an environmen-
tal policy in 1972, and the fourth environmental program, started 
in 1987, will be complete by 1992.32 The SEA inserts the title 
"Environment" into the EEC Treaty which did not previously 
29 [d. at art. 17(2). 
30 [d. at art. 5. 
31 See Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fUr Branntwein, 1979 E. Comm. 
Ct.]. Rep. 649, 26 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494 (1979) [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon]. 
32 Council Resolution of 19 October 1987 on the Continuation and Implementation of 
a European Community Policy and Action Programme on the Environment (1987-1992), 
300.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 328) 1 (1987). 
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contain any environmental provisions.33 With respect to environ-
mental litigation after 1992, the "polluter pays" principle pro-
fessed by the Community is the dominant relevant feature. This 
principle states that "[tJhe cost of preventing and eliminating 
nuisances must in principle be borne by the polluter."34 The 
principle, however, has merely been interpreted to bar member 
states from granting producers subsidies to allow them to comply 
with their environmental obligations.35 The "polluter pays" prin-
ciple has been applied piecemeal on a directive-by-directive basis 
in fields such as: waste,36 toxic and dangerous waste,37 disposal 
of PCBs,38 trans frontier shipments of hazardous waste,39 and 
major accident hazards posed by certain industrial activities.40 
Recently, however, the Commission published a Proposed 
Waste Liability Directive which if adopted would impose Civil 
liability for environmental damage or injury caused by waste.41 
The Proposed Waste Liability Directive is similar in approach to 
the 1985 Product Liability Directive. Based on article 130(R) of 
the EEC Treaty as amended by the SEA, it would extend the 
"polluter pays" principle to the arena of civil liability with respect 
33 SEA, supra note 2, at art. 25, amending EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 130(R). 
34 Council Declaration of 22 November 1973 on the Programme of Action of the 
European Communities on the Environment, 160.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C112) 1 (1973). 
See also Haagsma, The European Communities Environmental Policy, 12 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 
311, n.27 (1989). 
35 Vandermeersch, The Single European Act and the Environmental Policy of the European 
Economic Community, 12 EUR. L. REV. 407 (1987). 
36 Directive 75/442, Council Directive of 15 July 1975 on Waste, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 194) 39 (1975). 
37 Directive 78/319, Council Directive of 20 March 1978 on Toxic and Dangerous Waste, 
21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 84) 43 (1978). 
38 Directive 76/403, Council Directive of 6 April 1976 on the Disposal of Polychlorinated 
Biphenyls and Polychlorinated Terphenyls, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 108) 41 (1976). 
39 Directive 84/631, Council Directive of 6 December 1984 on the Supervision and 
Control Within the European Community of the Transfrontier Shipment of Hazardous 
Waste, 27 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 326) 31 (1984). 
40 Directive 82/501, Council Directive of 24 June 1982 on the Major-Accident Hazards 
of Certain Industrial Activities, 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 230) 1 (1982), modified by 
Directive 87/216, Council Directive of 19 March 1987 Amending Directive 82/501lEEC 
on the Major-Accident Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities, 30 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. 
L 85) 36 (1987). 
41 Proposal for a Council Directive of 1 September 1989 on Civil Liability for Damage 
Caused by Waste, COM(89) 292 final, 32 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 251) 3 (1989) [herein-
after Civil Liability Directive). See also Polluters Must Pay for Environmental Damage 
Caused on Waste, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 638, at 2 (1989) [hereinafter Proposed 
Waste Liability Directive); see also Polluters Must Pay for Environmental Damage Caused 
by Waste, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 638, at 2 (1989). 
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to all types of waste produced in the course of commercial activ-
ities but not to domestic waste or waste arising from consumer 
use of products.42 The Proposed Waste Liability Directive also 
imposes strict liability on the producers of the waste for causing 
damage.43 
These and other changes in the substantive law of the Euro-
pean Community and its member states will invariably invite 
litigation over issues of competence, implementation, and inter-
pretation. Changes in substantive law, however, are not the only 
changes affecting litigation. This Article now focuses on changes 
in litigation structures themselves, and developments in the areas 
of forum selection (Part I), choice of law (Part II), and enforce-
ment of judgments (Part III). 
I. FORVM SELECTION 
The factors to be considered by parties when selecting a forum 
for the adjudication of private disputes, where they are at some 
liberty to do so, are significantly more numerous and complex in 
transnational disputes than in any other context. Some crucial 
steps of the lawsuit are supposedly facilitated by international 
treaties, such as the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Hague Service Convention)44 and the Hague Convention 
on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial 
Matters (Hague Convention on Evidence).45 While the United 
States and most member states are parties to both conventions, 
Ireland has not ratified the Hague Service Convention. Similarly, 
Belgium, West Germany, and Ireland have all failed to ratify the 
Hague Convention on Evidence. In addition, both conventions 
are the subject of extensive litigation and have to some extent 
aggravated the difficulties they were designed to remedy. Indeed, 
for reasons described below, a number of foreign countries even 
42 Proposed Waste Liability Directive, supra note 41, at art. 1. 
43 [d. at art. 3. 
44 The Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 V.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 
V.N.T.S. 163. 
45 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
Mar. 18, 1970,23 V.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444,847 V.N.T.S. 23l. 
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prohibit the gathering of evidence on their territories for use in 
U.S. courts.46 None of these procedural features, however, appear 
to have any relation to European integration even though they 
will clearly affect transnational litigation with the Community. In 
the meantime, several significant events that are somewhat more 
linked to European integration have affected the jurisdictional 
landscape lately so as to modify the process by which parties 
normally select a forum for the resolution of their disputes. 
A. Changes Affecting the Available Forums and their jurisdictions 
Unlike the United States, there is no independent federal au-
thority with full jurisdiction over a matter in the Community. The 
Community's prescriptive and enforcement jurisdictions are con-
stitutionally limited to those matters delineated in the Community 
treaties. Therefore, member states normally retain sole jurisdic-
tion to regulate private business relationships and their courts 
preside over disputes arising therefrom. 
1. Community Courts: The Creation of the Court of First 
Instance 
One of the most noteworthy recent events is the creation of 
the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (Court 
of First Instance) which has functioned since September 1, 1989.41 
Like the Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance is modelled 
on the French Conseit d'Etat, the highest court with jurisdiction 
over relationships with administrative bodies. Like the Conseit 
d'Etat the Court of First Instance's proceedings are collegial in 
46 See, e.g., French Law No. 80-538, 1980 ].0. 1799, 1980 D.S.L. 285. A translation of 
the law appears in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District 
Court, 107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987). See generally Prescott & Alley, Effective Evidence Taking Under 
the Hague Convention, 22 INT'L LAW. 939 (1988). 
47 Decision 88/591, Council Decision of 24 October 1988 Establishing a Court of First 
Instance of the European Communities, 31 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1988), as 
amended by 32 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 241) 4 (1989) [hereinafter Court of First Instance]. 
The Court of First Instance officially began operation on September 25, 1989. The 
following individuals were selected as members of the court: the Honorable Mr.. Justice 
Donald P.M. Barrington, M. Jacques Biancarelli, M. Cornelis Paulus Briet, M. David 
Alexander Ogilvy Edward, M. Rafael Garcia-Valdecasas y Fernandez, M. Christos G. 
Geraris, M. Heinrich Kirschner, M. Koenrad Lenaerts, M. Antonio Saggio, M. Romain 
Schintgen, M. Bo Vesterdorff, M. Jose Luis da Cruz Vilaca. See Decision of 18 July 
Appointing the Members of the Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 
32 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 220) 76 (1989). 
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the sense that no dissenting opinions are issued, and deliberations 
are secret. The purpose of the Court of First Instance is to 
alleviate the Court of Justice's heavy caseload and thereby allow 
it to concentrate on the difficult legal issues raised by the necessity 
of ensuring uniform member state interpretation of Community 
law.48 
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance will, at least for 
the first two years, be limited to appeals from Commission deci-
sions on levies, price-fixing and competition law, and other actions 
of the Community institutions.49 The Court of First Instance will 
also have original jurisdiction over disputes between the Com-
munity and its employees.50 
After two years of operation, the court's jurisdiction may be 
extended by the Council of the European Communities (Council) 
to matters such as dumping and government subsidies. 51 Because 
the enforcement of Community antidumping and countervailing 
duty law is important to U.S. exporters, the Court of First In-
stance can be expected to become a major actor in trade disputes 
with the United States and Japan, not unlike the Court of Inter-
national Trade in the United States. 
The Court of Justice will retain exclusive jurisdiction over all 
preliminary references brought by national courts including those 
relating to EEC competition law. The Court of First Instance will 
hear appeals from Commission rulings on practical issues such 
as: the duty of manufacturers to provide warranty service 
throughout the Community for gray market goods; sanctions 
against price-fixing by nonmember state manufacturers whose 
products are imported into the Community; and the extent to 
which franchisers can interfere with franchisees' choices of sup-
pliers.52 Rulings by the Commission pursuant to the Merger Con-
48 The Court of First Instance will expedite the administration of pending cases, which 
averaged eighteen months prior to the creation of this court. By assuming jurisdiction 
over suits brought by Community employees, which roughly comprise one third of the 
Court of Justice's caseload, the Court of First Instance will significantly decrease the 
burden under which the Court of Justice has been operating. The Court of First Instance 
has received 150 suits for deliberation in 1990. Court of First Instance Starts Operations, 
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 638 (1989); Court of First Instance Sits for the First 
Time, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) No. 647 (1990). 
49 Court of First Instance, supra note 47, at art. 3(1)(a), (c). 
50Id. at art. 3(1)(b). 
51 Id. at art. 3(3). 
52 Until Sept. I, 1989, such issues were settled by the Court of Justice itself. Id. at 
Introduction. 
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trol Regulation will likewise be appealable to the Court of First 
Instance. The creation of this court promises to provide a signif-
icant safeguard against erroneous Commission determinations 
because it will handle matters requiring close examination of 
complex facts. 
The Court of First Instance will share the same procedural 
rules as those of the Court of Justice.53 In cases where both courts 
are hearing cases on the same issue of interpretation and that 
request the same relief, the Court of First Instance may stay the 
proceedings before it until the Court of Justice has delivered its 
judgment.54 When two different parties bring parallel suits for 
the same cause of action, the Court of First Instance may decline 
jurisdiction. Alternatively the Court of Justice may stay its pro-
ceedings.55 
Parties are granted the right to appeal to the Court of Justice 
within two months of the Court of First Instance's decisions. 56 
Such appeals are limited to points of law, as they are in member 
state courts. The grounds for appeal, which are also derived from 
French administrative law, include "lack of competence of the 
Court of First Instance, breach of procedural process adversely 
affecting the appellant's interest, [and] infringement of commu-
nity law."57 
The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance does not exceed 
the Court of Justice's jurisdiction which itself extends to matters 
involving the interpretation and application of Community law. 
Because Community law only covers matters affecting European 
economic integration, the jurisdiction of neither court may be 
compared to the U.S. federal judiciary, which has a more general 
jurisdiction. As a result, the courts of the individual member 
states must resolve many disputes that fall outside the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. 
2. Individual Member State Courts: Adoption of the Lugano 
Convention 
Most private disputes, including actions in tort, will remain 
within the sole jurisdiction of the individual member state courts. 
53 [d. at art. 7. 
54 [d. 
55 [d. 
56 [d. 
57 [d. 
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Two international conventions are changing the European land-
scape in this respect. After two decades, the 1968 Brussels Con-
vention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Brussels Convention)58 remains 
particularly significant to European practices. In force in all mem-
ber states except Spain and Portugal, the Brussels Convention 
provides uniform rules of jurisdiction, applicable to civil and 
commercial disputes, for individual and corporate defendants 
domiciled or headquartered in a member state. The convention 
solves difficult issues such as joinder of related claims pending in 
different courts and consolidation of related actions. More im-
portantly, the Brussels Convention, not unlike the "full faith and 
credit" clause of the U.S. Constitution, facilitates the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments throughout the Community. 
The Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Lugano Conven-
tion) marks the first opening of the Community to European 
nonmember states in the field of litigation. 59 The purpose of the 
Lugano Convention is to extend the rules of the Brussels Con-
vention, previously only applicable to civil and commercial mat-
ters involving parties having certain contacts with member states, 
to parties in countries that are members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA).60 The United States, in fact, could 
also technically become a party to the Lugano Convention, which 
would ensure uniform enforcement of U.S. judgments in most 
58 European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 11 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 97) 2 (1969); J.L.M. 229 
(1968) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]. The recognition and enforcement of judgments 
among the member states of the Brussels Convention differs drastically with the treatment 
of foreign judgments in the United States, where no federal statute, treaty or federal 
common law exists governing the enforcement of foreign judgments. See generally THIEF-
FRY & LECUYER-THIEFFRY, LE REGLEMENT DES LITIGES CIVILS ET COMMERCIAUX AVEC LES 
ETATS-UNIS (1986) [hereinafter Thieffry & Lecuyer-Thieffry]. The Brussels Convention 
is currently in force in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Italy, Ireland (since June 1988) and Greece (since June 1989). The 
ratification process is still pending in Spain and Portugal, as well as Iceland, Norway, 
Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden. 
59 Convention 88/592, Convention of 16 September 1988 on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments in Civil Matters and Commercial Matters, 31 0.]. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 319) 9 (1988) [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. 
6°Id. at art. 61(3). European Free Trade Association (EFTA) member states include 
Iceland, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden. The convention will become 
effective after it is ratified by at least one Community member state and one EFTA 
member state. 
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European countries. It is unlikely, however, that this will happen 
soon, for all parties to the Lugano Convention must consent, a 
step they may be reluctant to take in view of some unique features 
of U.S. litigation, such as pretrial discovery, jury trials, and pu-
nitive damages. 
B. The Forum Selection Process 
As is true in the United States, parties to a law suit in the 
Community do not always control the forum selection process. 
The single most significant example of forced forum selection is 
in the area of enforcement of competition rules. In this area, the 
Commission can initiate a case on its own motion, after a request 
for clearance, or upon receiving a complaint. The Commission 
can then impose sanctions, and appeals can be brought before 
the Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice.51 In the 
event that the involved parties are not located within the Com-
munity, the jurisdictions of the Commission and the courts will 
not be defeated.52 
In the bulk of disputes between private litigants, however, the 
forum is usually a member state's court, and its selection is of 
paramount importance in international disputes involving pecu-
niary reparation. Illustratively, damages awarded in the several 
member states for similar injuries are not likely to become iden-
tical merely as a result of the adoption of the Products Liability 
Directive. Neither will the disparities become closer between the 
varying periods of time that elapse between the filing of lawsuits 
and judgments, or the different burdens and expenses of ap-
pearing before member state courts. 
In tort actions, the Brussels Convention-and, when it comes 
into force, the Lugano Convention-will generally cause injured 
persons to bring suit either in the member state where the acci-
dent took place or in the state where the product was manufac-
61 Alternatively, instead of filing a complaint with the Commission, any injured party 
can bring a law suit in a member state's court with jurisdiction. 
62 A. Ahlstrom Osakeyhitio v. Commission, 1988, E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. __ , Comm. 
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~14,491, aff'g Commission's ruling at 27 0.]. Eur. Comm. (No. L 85) 
2 (1984), Comm. Mkt. Rep. (CCH) ~10,654 (1985) [hereinafter, woodpulp decision). In 
the Wood pulp Decision, the Court of Justice confirmed that collusion need not occur 
within the EC, so long as it was implemented there. 
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tured.63 In contract actions, the plaintiff, a former commercial 
agent or distributor for example, will normally sue in the member 
state where performance either occurred or was to take place.64 
Although the plaintiff has the option of suing in the member 
state where the defendant is domiciled,65 this is usually an expen-
sive and burdensome alternative. 
If the defendant is not domiciled in the Community, however, 
as would be the case with a U.S. exporter, the member state's 
rules on jurisdiction are fully applicable. In most circumstances, 
these rules would lead to similar results.66 Obviously, the role of 
the Court of Justice in harmonizing differences in the application 
of the rules of the Brussels and Lugano Convention will be ex-
tremely significant. The Court of Justice'S jurisdiction, however, 
does not extend beyond securing harmonious and consistent ap-
plication of community law by member state courts and will not 
interfere with factual findings such as the quantum of damages. 
1. Forum Shopping and the Nonmember State Defendant: 
The Example of Product Liability 
The new product liability legislation supplies a topical example 
of a plaintiff's perspective on forum shopping. A party injured 
in the Community by a product manufactured in the United 
States will probably prefer to file a lawsuit in the courts of the 
injured party's place of residence against the importer of the 
defective products. Assuming that the importer has assets within 
63 Brussels Convention, supra note 58, at art. 5 provides that: "A person domiciled in a 
Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be sued in matters relating to tort, 
delict or quasi-delict, in the courts of the place where the harmful event occurred .... " 
The Court of Justice has ruled that this provision encompasses the courts of both the 
place where the accident occurred and that of where the event was originally caused. Bier 
v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, S.A., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735 (1976). 
64 Brussels Convention, supra note 58, at art. 5(1) provides that: 
Id. 
A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State be 
sued: 
... in matters relating to a contract, in the courts of the place of performance 
of the obligation in question; 
(5) as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or 
other establishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or 
other establishment is situated. 
65Id. at art. 2. 
66 French courts, for example, would retain jurisdiction over disputes when a tort 
occurred or produced effects in France and when a contract's performance occurred in 
France. Noveau Code de Procedure Civil, 1981, at art. 46. 
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the Community, suing the importer rather than the actual foreign 
producer would be simpler, less costly, and more efficient for the 
plaintiff. The Product Liability Directive renders proceeding 
against the importer possible and states that "any person who 
imports into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or 
any form of distribution in the course of his business ... shall be 
responsible as a producer."67 If the producer is not identified, a 
supplier will be considered a producer and can be sued as a 
producer, "unless he informs the injured person, within a rea-
sonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the person 
who supplied him with the product."68 Thus, there is no incentive 
in the directive for the injured person to sue the foreign producer 
directly, even if it is possible. 
Regardless of whether the plaintiff sues the importer or an-
other supplier, the defendant may implead the actual producer 
under the forum's rules of jurisdiction and procedure. Such a 
defendant may also bring a separate claim against the actual 
producer after a judgment has been entered against him. A sep-
arate claim, however, depends on their contractual arrangements, 
assuming some kind of indemnification or "hold harmless" pro-
vision has been agreed upon between them. 
The Product Liability Directive further provides that "the lia-
bility of the producer ... may not, in relation to the injured person, 
be limited or excluded by a provision limiting his liability or 
exempting him from liability."69 It is likely that this provision 
shall be interpreted to allow contractual apportionment of liability 
between the actual producer, the importer into the Community 
or a particular member state, and all other distributors or dealers 
thereof. It should be stressed, however, that indemnification and 
"hold harmless" agreements are quite unusual in civil law coun-
tries and therefore should be drafted with caution so as not to 
endanger their effectiveness. 
A less logical course of action, at least insofar as the European 
framework is concerned, is for the injured plaintiff to bring suit 
directly against a nonmember state producer in the latter's coun-
try. One must not completely rule out the possibility of lawsuits 
being brought in nonmember state courts where choice of law 
rules would direct these courts to apply a member state law and, 
67 See Product Liability Directive, supra note 27, at art. 3(2). 
68Id. at art. 3(3). 
69Id. at art. 12 (emphasis added). 
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therefore, a law derived from the Product Liability Directive. For 
example, a person injured in a member state by a product made 
in the United States may sue the U.S. producer in a U.S. court. 
In this case, the U.S. defendant may successfully plead forum non 
conveniens. In certain specific sets of instances, however, as where 
the plaintiff is a U.S. citizen, the defendant may not raise forum 
non conveniens successfully and the law of the place where the 
accident occurred might be applied. 
Some U.S. producers and Anglo-American lawyers appear con-
vinced that the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be an 
inadequate defense for U.S. defendants, because U.S. courts will 
recognize the hardship for the plaintiff of being deprived of 
specific U.S. procedural devices such as discovery. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled in Piper Aircraft v. 
Reyno that the presumption favoring plaintiff's choice of forum 
applies with diminished force when the plaintiff is a foreign 
citizen. 70 The outcome of such issues, however, turns upon a 
balancing of private and public interest factors which appear to 
favor the choice of U.S. courts where there is U.S. involvement 
in the alleged tortious conduct and the interests of U.S. courts in 
resolving the dispute are significant. 71 Furthermore, the network-
ing of the U.S. plaintiff bar and some European equivalents, such 
as the British, reportedly would facilitate the filing of such cases 
in the United States. Meanwhile, potential defendants' counsels 
develop theories under which the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
should bar such attempts.72 To a European observer, it appears 
that U.S. courts should be inhospitable to such actions because 
Community institutions never intended the Products Liability Di-
rective to be applied under the U.S. procedural system. Appli-
cation of the directive by U.S. courts carries the potential of 
creating further distortions between competitors. Finally, poten-
tial U.S. defendants should note that the cost of defense and the 
amount of damages awarded by European courts are lower than 
in the United States. While it may seem impractical and more 
costly for a non-U.S. plaintiff to sue in a U.S. court,73 such a suit 
may well bring a harsh result for the U.S. producer. 
70 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 at 257-59 (1981). 
71 Birnbaum & Dunham, Foreign Plaintiffs and Forum Non Conveniens, 14 BROOKLYN J. 
INT'L L. __ (to be published 1990). 
72Id. 
73 Bringing suit in the United States may appear more costly to European consumers 
who are not accustomed to contingent fees. 
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2. Are U.S. Courts an Alternative Forum in Transatlantic 
Disputes? 
With respect to transatlantic disputes, most litigants are gen-
erally distressed by the procedures of the courts of the other 
country. U.S. style procedural rules, the absence of which U.S. 
litigants tend to criticize in European courts, are precisely those 
considered to be the most outrageous by European litigants in 
U.S. courts. The procedural conditions which led to the current 
liability crisis in the United States do not exist in Europe.74 Even 
in the two common law member states, the United Kingdom and 
Ireland, certain U.S. procedural and institutional devices, such 
as discovery, oral testimony, cross-examination, and jury trials are 
much less widely available than in the United States. 
a. The Absence of Discovery 
Not only is discovery totally unknown to most civil law systems, 
in a number of civil law countries, and even common law coun-
tries such as the United Kingdom, "blocking statutes" prohibit 
the supply of information for the purpose of participating in 
pretrial discovery.75 The party that alleges facts has the burden 
of proving them, which is normally done by producing written 
documents into evidence. Prior to hearings on the merits, parties 
must exchange the documents upon which they intend to rely so 
that each party has the opportunity to analyze and elaborate on 
the other's offers of proof. 76 While parties have a legal right to 
request the court to order the production of a document held by 
a third party, this right is exercised only for particularly important 
documents.77 
74 See generally, Thieffry & Lecuyer-Thieffry, supra note 58. 
75 E.g., French Law No. 80-538, supra note 46 at art. I-bis. Article I-bis of the 1980 law 
provides: 
Subject to international treaties and agreements, all persons are prescribed from 
asking for, searching or communicating by writing, orally or in any other form, 
documents or information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or 
technical nature, meant for the establishment of evidence in a foreign jurisdic-
tional or administrative proceeding or in relation thereof. 
Id. See also the statutes enacted by: Canada, Uranium Information Security Regulations, 
CAN. STAT. O. & R., 76-644 (P.C. 1976-2368, Sept. 21, 1976); Australia, Foreign Proceed-
ings (prohibition of certain evidence) Act; 1976, Austl. Acts. No. 121; England, Protection 
of Trading Interests Act 1980, ch. 11,47 Halsbury's Statutes 454 (4th ed. 1988). 
76 E.g., NOVEAU CODE DE PROC~DURE CIVIL, 1981, at art. 132. 
77 Id. at art. 138. 
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Furthermore, depositions and interrogatories are completely 
unheard of in civil law countries. Even in England, no depositions 
are taken except in unusual circumstances. Document demands 
and interrogatories are possible only with leave of the court. 
Discovery against nonparties is not available except in personal 
injury actions, and the circumstances for which it is available are 
much narrower than in the United States. Such narrow discovery 
rules prevent "fishing expeditions."78 
b. Less Adversarial Hearings 
Unlike U.S. procedures, civil law procedures do not allow direct 
or cross-examination of witnesses. Oral testimony is extremely 
rare-at least in civil practice-and parties cannot testify. Above 
all, the trial of similar cases is much shorter in civil law countries 
than in the United States or other common law countries. This 
is primarily due to the absence of oral testimony or, when oral 
testimony is allowed, to the absolute prohibition on lawyers from 
addressing witnesses at any time. It is unethical (and the evidence 
would be inadmissible) for a lawyer to speak with a witness, 
whether during a hearing or in preparation of his testimony. 
Thus, hearings in major civil and commercial cases can be limited 
to a few hours and run scarcely more than a half day. Such cases 
are normally limited to the lawyers' oral arguments, presented 
after the filing of elaborate pleadings introducing all legal and 
factual arguments on behalf of the parties.79 
c. The Absence of Juries 
Europeans are wary of U.S. jury trials because of the wide 
discrepancies in awards between Community and U.S. jurisdic-
tions. In civil law countries, juries do not participate in civil or 
commercial matters. Although some special courts with jurisdic-
tion over serious criminal cases do use juries, most judgments are 
rendered by courts composed of three professional judges. Be-
cause there is no need to protect juries against inadmissible evi-
dence, the rules of evidence are much less sophisticated than in 
the United States. Thus, even hearsay has long been admissible 
evidence.8o 
78 Epstein, English Discovery Simpler and Cheaper, Nat'l. L.j., Nov. 28, 1988, at 17-19. 
79 See Thieffry and U:cuyer-Thieffry, supra note 58, at 144. 
80 [d. 
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d. Public Prosecution of Crimes of an Economic Nature 
Another concept, largely foreign to European procedural sys-
tems, is that of the private attorney general. Treble damages, 
punitive damages, and contingent fees are unknown both in civil 
law countries and in the United Kingdom,81 and class actions are 
still a recent and exceptional phenomenon.82 The more simple 
European procedures are supposed to allow victims of accidents 
to recover without such devices. In addition, in the United King-
dom, the losing party must bear the winning party's costS.83 When 
faced with a choice between suing in a U.S. or a member state 
court, the European forum shopper should clearly consider these 
procedural and institutional differences. 
II. CHOICE OF LAW 
Besides the procedural features discussed above, another well-
known reason for forum shopping is the fact that different juris-
dictions all have their own choice of law rules that often create 
significant distortions. Although fewer than the changes affecting 
the courts' jurisdictions and procedures, some proposed and on-
going changes in choice of law rules should be noted. 
A. Conventions Bearing on Choice of Law Considerations 
Discrepancies between member state laws may be greater with 
respect to their choice of law rules than in most other areas. Even 
the sale of goods, the simplest and most common type of business 
relationship, is not the subject matter of a unified body of choice 
of law rules. The Convention on the Law Applicable to Interna-
tional Sales of Goods (Hague Conflicts Convention) was ratified 
by only eight European countries.84 Under the Hague Conflicts 
81 E.g., for judgments in France, see Thieffry and U'cuyer-Thieffry, supra note 58. For 
judgments in England, see Epstein, supra note 78. 
82 E.g., for French procedure, see Thieffry & Lecuyer-Thieffry, supra note 58, at 198. 
83 Epstein, supra note 78; Leibman, The European Community'S Products Liability Directive: 
Is the U.S. Experience Applicable?, 18 LAW & POLICY IN INT'L Bus., 795-814 (1986). 
84 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods, 15 June 
1955,510 U.N.T.S. 149 (1964) [hereinafter Hague Conflicts Convention]. This convention 
came into force on 1 September 1964 and was adopted by France, Belgium, Switzerland, 
Italy, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland and Niger. It has been revised by the recent 
Hague Convention on the Law Apphcable to Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods, 30 October 1985,24 I.L.M. 1573 (1985) which is in effect a "Uniform Choice of 
Law Treaty." 
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Convention, courts of contracting states will apply the law clearly 
chosen by the parties either expressly or implicitly.85 Where the 
parties have not agreed on the applicable law, the sale is governed 
by the law of the country where the seller had its usual place of 
business at the time it received the order.86 If the order is received 
by a branch, the law of the country in which the branch is located 
is applied.87 If the order has been received in the purchaser's 
country by its seller or agent, then the law of the purchaser's 
country of residence, or that of the country where the ordering 
branch is located, applies.88 Finally, the law of the country where 
the goods are to be examined applies to the mode of examination 
and time periods within which such examination and the corre-
sponding notices must be made.89 
Other relevant conventions have attempted to unify the sub-
stantive provisions of the contracting states' laws rather than their 
choice of law rules. The Hague Convention on Uniform Law for 
the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) and the Hague Conven-
tion on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (ULF) are currently in force in nine countries.90 Of these, 
only Italy is a member of the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, signed in Vienna 
on April 10, 1980 (CISG).9J The CISG is already in force in 
seventeen countries, including the United States, France, and 
Italy.92 At least five more countries, including West Germany, 
B5Id. at art. 2. 
B6Id. at art. 3. 
B7Id. 
BBld. 
B9Id. at art. 4. 
90 The Hague Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of 
Goods, 1 July 1964, 834 U.N.T.S. 107 (1972) [hereinafter ULIS]. Hague Convention 
Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods July 1, 1964,834 U.N.T.S. 169 (1972) [hereinafter ULF]. Both conventions have 
been in effect since 1972 by ratification of 5 states. As of January 1, 1988, the members 
were Belgium, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, San Marino and the United Kingdom. 
91 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 
10, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 97118, 19 I.L.M. 668, 671 (1980) reprinted in Public Notice, 
52 Fed. Reg. 262-80 (1987) [hereinafter CISG]. See also Thieffry, Sale of Goods Between 
French and u.S. Merchants: Choice of Law Considerations under the U.N. Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods, 22 INT'L LAW. 1017 (1988). 
92 The following countries are currently parties to the CISG: 
Argentina (acceded July 19, 1983) effective Jan. 1, 1988. 
Australia (acceded May 17, 1988) effective Apr. I, 1989. 
Austria (ratified Dec. 29, 1987) effective Jan. I, 1989. 
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have deposited their instruments of ratification with the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNClTRAL). 
The ClSe should be in force in at least twenty-two countries by 
early 1990.93 
The ClSe offers uniform rules albeit at the cost of introducing 
new or foreign legal concepts or mechanisms into their relation-
ships. The ClSe, however, does not apply to all sales contracts. 
Article 2 of the ClSe states that sales to consumers of commercial 
paper, money, ships, and vessels by auction, execution, or other 
authority of law are excluded from the scope of the ClSe. In 
addition, the convention does not govern issues other than "the 
formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations 
of the seller and buyer arising from such a contract." Therefore, 
the ClSe does not cover the validity of the contract, its individual 
provisions, or the effect of the contract upon title to goods. As a 
consequence, while the ClSe may resolve certain ambiguities 
concerning individual contracts for the sale of goods, it will not 
rule out choice of forum and choice of law considerations during 
the negotiation process of such contracts.94 
Due to the limited success of the Hague Conflicts Convention, 
ULlS, and ULF, and the substantive nature of the ClSe, the 
broad scope of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Con-
Egypt (acceded Dec. 6, 1982) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Finland (ratified Dec. IS, 1987) effective Jan. I, 1989. 
France (approved Aug. 6,1982) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Hungary (ratified June 16, 1983) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Italy (ratified Dec. II, 1986) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Lesotho (ratified July 18,1981) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Mexico (ratified Dec. 29,1987) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Norway (acceded July 20,1988) effective Aug. 1,1989. 
People's Republic of China (approved Dec. 11, 1986) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Syrian Arab Republic (approved Dec. II, 1986) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Sweden (ratified Dec. IS, 1987) effective Jan. I, 1989. 
United States of America (ratified Dec. 11, 1986) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Yugoslavia (ratified Mar. 27, 1985) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
Zambia (acceded June 16, 1986) effective Jan. I, 1988. 
See Editors Note, "The UN Convention Contracts for the International Sale of Goods," An Update, 
23 INT'L LAW. 797-98 (1989). According to one commentator, several other countries are 
considering ratification or accession, i.e., Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and 
Switzerland. See Winship, The International Sale of Goods Manuscript, cited in Alejandro M. 
Garro, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in UN Convention for the International Sale of Goods, 
23 INT'L LAW. 443, n.7 (1989). 
93 CISG, supra note 91, at art. 2. All sales of goods between the United States and 
France or Italy, inter alia, are governed by the Convention. 
94 Thieffry, supra note 91, at 1017-22. 
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tractual Obligations (Rome Convention), which was opened for 
signature by Community member states in Rome in June 1980, 
will be a significant complement to the present legal framework. 95 
Not unlike the Hague Conflicts Convention, the Rome Conven-
tion provides that any contract, not only those concerning the 
sale of goods, shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties.96 
If no law has been chosen, the law of the country "with which 
the contract is most closely connected" will apply.97 The Rome 
Convention presumes that the contract is most likely connected 
to the country of the performing party's habitual residence, cen-
tral administration, or principal place of business, depending on 
the case. The performing party is the party who effects perfor-
mance characteristic of the contract.98 Thus, if the presumption 
is not rebutted in a dispute involving a distributorship or license 
agreement for a U.S. territory, the relevant U.S. law could be 
applied by a member state court under the Rome Convention. 
Like the Brussels Convention, but unlike the Lugano Conven-
tion involving nonmember state countries, the Rome Convention 
will be interpreted uniformly within the Community.99 When the 
need for interpretation of any provision arises, the member state 
courts may stay their proceeding and refer questions to the Court 
of Justice for a preliminary ruling before making their judg-
ments. IOO Since the Rome Convention's provisions are complex, 
the need for interpretation will probably arise quite often. Most 
member state choice of law provisions give primary importance 
to the place of performance, place of contemplated performance, 
or assessment of the "localization" of the contracts. iOl Therefore, 
for typical cases, the results achieved by application of the Rome 
Convention should be quite similar to those presently obtained 
by the member state choice of laws provisions. 
95 Convention 80/934, Convention of 19 June 1980 on the Law Applicable to Contrac-
tual Obligations, 23 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 266) I (1980) [hereinafter Rome Convention). 
It is relevant to note that the Communities' Draft Convention was originally designed to 
cover contractual and non-contractual [tort) obligations but was subsequently amended, 
dropping the provisions on non-contractual obligations. 
96Id. at art. 3(1). 
97Id. at art. 4(1). 
98Id. at art. 4(2). 
99 Id. at art. 18. 
100 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 177(1)(a). 
101 H. BATIFFOL & P. LAGARDE, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 265 (1983). 
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B. The Absence of Uniform Conflict of Law Rules in Non-
Contractual Disputes: An Incentive to Forum Shop in Products 
Liability Actions 
Whenever a product liability suit is filed in a court in France, 
Luxembourg, or the Netherlands, the applicable national law is 
likely to be determined by the court in accordance with the pro-
visions of the 1973 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Product Liability (Hague Convention). 102 The Hague Convention 
directs the courts of signatory countries to apply the law of the 
"[s]tate of the place of injury,"I03 the "[s]tate of the habitual 
residence of the person directly suffering the damage,"I04 or the 
"[s]tate of the principal place of business of the person claimed 
to be liable,"lo5 depending on other contacts between the parties 
and these countries. The scope of the Hague Convention, how-
ever, is not identical to that of the Product Liability Directive. For 
example, the Hague Convention is not limited to claims where 
the product has been supplied to the injured person by the de-
fendant. 106 
Likewise, product liability actions not within the scope of the 
Hague Convention, like those filed in the courts of the nine 
member states not parties to the Hague Convention, will be set-
tled according to the forum's own choice of law rules. In most 
cases, the applicable law will be that of the country where the 
accident took place or that of the country where the injury was 
sustained. In any event, it cannot be assumed that the same 
substantive rules of law will apply to all product liability suits filed 
in the Community resulting from accidents having occurred 
therein or filed by injured residents thereof. 
102 Conference de La Haye de Droit International Prive, Actes et Documents de la douzieme 
session du 2 au 21 Octobre 1972, Tome III, Responsabilite du Fait des Produits, Acte Final 246-
50 (/974) [hereinafter Conference de La Haye]. Non-Community countries, such as 
Norway and Yugoslavia, are also parties to the Hague Convention on the law applicable 
to products liability. Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Portugal, which are member states, are 
signatories of the Hague Convention but have never ratified it. See Reese, The Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 8 INT'L LAW. 606 (1974); Reese, Further 
Comments on the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 8 GA. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 311 (1978). 
103 Hague Convention, supra note 102, at art. 4. 
104/d. at art. 5. 
105 /d. at art. 6. 
106 I d. at art. 1. 
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Even when all member states have finally incorporated the 
Product Liability Directive l07 into their domestic laws, their pro-
visions will remain somewhat different owing, among other fac-
tors, to the options the directive makes available to the member 
states. 108 If, for example, the law of West Germany is applicable, 
the overall liability of a producer shall be limited to DM160 
million, whereas the producer's liability for identical items with 
similar defects will not be similarly capped in other member 
states. Primary agricultural products and game will apparently 
be subject to the directive's system in France, Luxembourg and 
Italy and-as far as it is possible to expect at the time of this 
paper-not in other member states. Manufacturers will not be 
exposed to a uniform regime regarding available defenses to 
them since member states are permitted to rule out the "state of 
the art" defense, which France, Luxembourg, and Spain have 
considered at times. In addition, the wording of the new statutes 
and the extent to which the directive will have led the member 
states to modify their existing systems will differ noticeably. In 
countries which are expected to modify their civil codes, such as 
the Netherlands and France, significant reforms to their general 
liability system will result from their incorporation of the direc-
tive. Another source of distortion rests in the incorporation of 
supplementary provisions into the directive's requirements by the 
107 Product Liability Directive, supra note 27. 
108 These differences, to a great extent, will be due to the leeway the directive provides 
the member states. For example, if the law of the Federal Republic of Germany is 
applicable, the overall liability of a producer shall be limited to 160 million DM, whereas 
the producer's liability for identical items with similar defects will not be similarly capped 
in other member states. Primary agricultural products and game will apparently be subject 
to the directive's system only in France, Luxembourg, and Italy. Manufacturers will not 
be exposed to a uniform regime of available defenses since member states are permitted 
to eliminate the "state of the art" defense. 
In addition, the wording of new domestic statutes and the extent to which Directive 
85/374 will lead member states to modify their existing systems will differ noticeably. In 
member states which are expected to modify their civil codes, such as the Netherlands 
and France, significant reforms in their general liability systems will result from their 
incorporation of the directive. 
Another source of distortion rests in the incorporation of supplementary provisions 
along with the directive's requirements into the implementing statutes of the member 
states. For example, the Italian statute and the French intermediate draft both define the 
"putting into circulation" of the product, while other statutes might not do so. In this 
respect, it is not insignificant that the incorporation of the directive into the member 
states' domestic law does not prevent prior legal provisions, however different, to be used 
as a basis for products liability action. 
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implementing statutes of the member states. For example, the 
Italian statute and the French intermediate draft both define the 
"putting into circulation" of the product,109 while other statutes 
might not do so. In this respect it is not insignificant that the 
incorporation of the directive in the member states' national laws 
does not prevent legal provisions to be used as a basis for products 
liability action, however different they are. The lack of uni-
formity in member states' statutes of limitations will only consti-
tute a further incentive to forum ShOp,11O as plaintiffs will tend 
to circumvent the effect of statutes of limitations in some juris-
dictions by bringing suit in others where the statute of limitation 
has not elapsed. Sensitive to this issue, the Products Liability 
Directive provides a uniform statute of limitation to be applied 
in products liability cases. 1l1 The conflict of law rules command-
ing the application of a member state law incorporating the di-
rective might not apply, however, to the issue of which law should 
determine the limitation periods. Consequently, the directive's 
liability rules could be applied by a nonmember state court to-
gether with the forum's longer statute of limitation. Furthermore, 
because the directive has not suppressed actions under preexist-
ing member state laws, the application of these laws and their 
corresponding statutes of limitations will be determined by the 
forum's choice of law rules and will not necessarily lead to con-
sistent results. 
Indeed, European plaintiffs may attempt to bring their com-
plaints against U.S. defendants in jurisdictions applying longer 
statutes of limitations. The harsher treatment of claims by the 
U.S. courts and the longer statutes of limitations afforded would 
most likely constitute a dual benefit to these plaintiffs. Recogniz-
ing the excessive harshness of the situation for U.S. producers, 
the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws was recently 
amended by providing that the forum should not apply its longer 
109 Art. 7 of the Italian statute and article 1387-22 of the French intermediate draft. 
110 In light of the United States' adoption of the CISG, some commentators believe that 
the U.S. may consider ratifying the U.N. Convention on the Limitation Period in the 
International Sale of Goods, 13 I.L.M. 952 (1974). See Pfund, International Unification of 
Private Law, A Report on U.S. Participation-1987-88, 22 INT'L LAW. 1157 (1988). 
III Product Liability Directive, supra note 27, at art. 10. Article 10 requires a three-year 
statute of limitations which runs from the time plaintiff becomes aware or reasonably 
should have been aware of the defeat. Id. 
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statute of limitations if there exists a shorter one in a jurisdiction 
with closer contacts. 1I2 
III. ENFORCEMENT 
When one or both parties can influence forum selection, they 
should also consider available enforcement mechanisms. V.S. de-
fendants will most often be indifferent to which forum renders 
an unfavorable judgment. When the judgment is not rendered 
in the V.S., the judgment's enforcement will normally be obtained 
in the V nited States. 113 Experience shows, however, that proce-
dural difficulties may arise which make transnational enforce-
ment more burdensome than expected. Particularly surprising to 
V.S. parties, however, is that enforcement of a member state court 
judgment can also be sought throughout the Community.114 For 
winning V.S. plaintiffs, whether the judgment is made by a V.S. 
or member state court has a significant impact on the cost, bur-
den, and likelihood of its enforcement. 
A. Enforcement of Member States' Judgments in Other Member States 
As discussed, the Brussels Convention facilitates recognition 
and enforcement of judgments throughout the Community, and 
the Lugano Convention will extend this system to EFTA coun-
tries. Vnder the Brussels Convention, a judgment rendered by 
any member state court will be readily enforceable in any other 
member state. 1l5 
In view of the cost of enforcing a judgment in the V nited 
States, a V.S. producer could become a party to a product liability 
lawsuit, joined with the importer or the supplier of the product, 
so that enforcement could nevertheless be pursued within the 
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 142 (1971), (amended 1988), aban-
dons the traditional procedural characterization of statutes of limitation. Accordingly, 
courts select the law governing the statute of limitation on the same standards as are used 
to decide other choice oflaw questions. See C. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICTS 
OF LAW 114 (4th ed. 1987). 
113 See, e.g., BORN & WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 56 (1989); THiEFFRY & U:CUYER-THIEFFRY, supra note 58. 
114 [d. 
115 Although title II of the Brussels Convention on "Jurisdiction" does not in principle 
apply where the defendant is not domiciled in a contracting State, title III on "Recognition 
and Enforcement" applies to "any judgment given by a court or a tribunal of a Contracting 
State," irrespective of the parties. Brussels Convention, supra note 58, at arts. 24-25. 
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Community.116 Under the Products Liability Directive, the pro-
ducer and other defendants may be held jointly and severally 
liable for the same damage "without prejudice to the provisions 
of national law concerning the rights of contribution or re-
course."1l7 Likewise, if the foreign producer is not joined as a 
defendant, its liability can nevertheless be separately pursued by 
a defendant against whom a judgment is entered as this would 
be "without prejudice to the provisions of national law concerning 
the rights of contribution or recourse."1l8 
The Brussels Convention provides exceptions to enforcement 
within the Community on the following grounds: public policy; 
default judgments in the absence of proper service and oppor-
tunity to defend; conflicts with earlier judgments of other con-
tracting states; inconsistency with certain jurisdictional principles 
laid down in the convention; and judgments involving status, 
marital status, capacity, or succession. 1l9 
Of particular relevance to nonmember state parties is article 
28(1) of the Brussels Convention which excuses member states 
from enforcing other member state judgments if the judgment 
is based on the exercise of exorbitant personal jurisdiction. 120 
These jurisdictional restrictions, however, extend only to actions 
brought against member state nationals. 121 As a result, courts will 
116 While the process may be costly, u.s. policy is favorable to enforcement of foreign 
judgments. Since there is no federal statute or treaty applicable to the enforcement of 
foreign country judgments in u.s. courts, however, the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments is governed by the common law and statutes of the individual states. 
Statutes such as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, enforced by 
some 16 States, are an exception to this rule. See 100 A.L.R. 3d 792 (1989) (The National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association 
approved the Act in 1962). Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894) established the U.S. 
general rule favoring the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments without any 
re-examination by a U.S. court of the merits of the parties' dispute. It further identified 
a number of exceptions: that the foreign judicial proceedings were either unfair or biased; 
the foreign court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant; the foreign court lacked 
subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute; there was a showing of fraud and other 
irregularities in the foreign proceedings; the foreign cause of action of judgment violated 
U.S. public policy; the foreign court that rendered the judgment would not be willing to 
enforce U.S. judgments on a reciprocal basis. Id. at 228. Courts examining these excep-
tions, however, have construed them in an extremely limited fashion. See generally BORN 
& WESTIN, supra note 113, at 564-604. 
117 Product Liability Directive, supra note 27. 
118Id. 
119 Brussels Convention, supra note 58, at art. 27. 
120 !d. at art. 28. 
121Id. 
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enforce judgments based on exorbitant exercise of personal ju-
risdiction against nationals of nonmember states. Therefore, 
should a judgment be entered against a U.S. individual or com-
pany in one member state, such judgment will be enforced and 
recognized in any other member state where the U.S. party 
merely possesses assets, irrespective of whether or not it has any 
other contact with the member state. For example, a foreign 
plaintiff could bring an action against the U.S. party in a member 
state solely based on the nationality of the plaintiff, which under 
article 14 of the French Civil Code is a jurisdictional basis, or on 
the presence of property owned by the U.S. party, regardless of 
whether that property was related in any way to the dispute. A 
judgment based on such an assertion of jurisdiction could be 
enforced in any member state. 122 
B. Enforcement of Nonmember State Judgments in the Member States 
Because the United States is not a signatory to the Brussels 
Convention, nor to any bilateral or multilateral treaty facilitating 
the enforcement of foreign judgments, an assessment of the dif-
ficulties of obtaining enforcement of U.S. judgments should be 
made on a country-by-country basis. 
For example, the Belgian Judicial Code123 provides for court 
examination of the merits of the foreign judgment and allows 
the court to decide whether to enforce all, part, or none of the 
foreign judgment. Enforcement of a U.S. judgment is granted in 
the United Kingdom if it is final, for a definite sum of money, 
and rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. This raises 
serious difficulty for judgments obtained through the application 
of broad state long-arm statutes. Enforcement of foreign judg-
ments in France124 can be obtained if the following five conditions 
are satisfied: the foreign court which rendered the decision had 
jurisdiction; the procedure was not irregular; the applicable law 
was in accord with that which would have been applicable under 
French conflict of law rules; the decision complied with interna-
tional public policy; and the decision was not tainted by fraud. 
122 BORN & WESTIN, supra note 113, at 603-604. France, for example, has more than 
thirty such bilateral treaties. 
m Belgian Judicial Code, at art. 570. 
124 Thieffry-Lecuyer, The Enforcement of u.s. Judgments in France, reprinted in, Enforcement 
of u.s. Judgments Abroad (Westin ed. 1989) (Manuscript to be published by the A.B.A. 
Section of International Law and Practice) [hereinafter Thieffry-Lecuyer]. 
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In following these standards, French courts have abandoned their 
nineteenth century practice of reviewing the merits of foreign 
cases. 
It is clear from these limited examples that the enforcement of 
U.S. judgments in the Community will meet with varying degrees 
of resistance. 125 In view of such a hostile panorama concerning 
enforceability, U.S. litigants could be tempted to consider bring-
ing actions in member state courts where possible. By virtue of 
the Brussels Convention, enforcement of these judgments could 
be achieved in any member state with little or no trouble. 
At this point, the question may be raised whether a U.S. litigant 
could, in fact, attain a U.S. judgment, seek its recognition in a 
less hostile member state (like the United Kingdom), and, there-
upon, attempt to enforce the member state court's judgment of 
recognition in another member state through the mechanisms 
offered by the Brussels Convention. It is unclear whether the 
Brussels Convention contemplates such usage. It is interesting to 
note that the Brussels Convention defines judgment as any judg-
ment given by a court or tribunal of a contracting state, however 
described, including a decree, order, decision, writ of execution, 
or determination of costs or expenses by any officer of the 
court. 126 By making explicit reference to writs of execution, the 
convention can be read to facilitate member state recognition and 
enforcement of nonmember state judgments. This issue of inter-
pretation, however, has not been decided by the Court of Justice 
and, thus, remains open. 
In light of these potential enforcement difficulties, private par-
ties to contracts often consider arbitration as a consensual means 
of dispute settlement. The enforcement of arbitral awards is fa-
cilitated by a specific international treaty, the 1958 New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards (New York Convention).127 The New York Con-
vention is in force in over eighty-three countries, including the 
United States and all twelve member states except Portugal. In 
addition, European countries have traditionally served as arbitra-
tion posts between nonmember states and especially U.S. busi-
125 Such differences also exist with other member states. 
126 Brussels Convention, supra note 58, at art. 25; see also Lugano Convention, supra 
note 59. 
127 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards,june 10, 1958,21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 9 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1988). 
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nesses, on the one hand, and Middle and Far Eastern businesses 
on the other. 
It is also noteworthy that a number of member states, together 
with many other countries, are engaged in a worldwide contest 
to improve their arbitration statutes to become one of the more 
hospitable places for arbitration. 128 
CONCLUSION 
Except in the more crucial areas, such as the regulation of 
competition, the integration-related law-making process is not 
one of preemption of national laws by Community law but rather 
one of mandatory modification of the former which remain in 
full force. Not all distortions can be removed, due among other 
things to the very roots of the member states' civil and common 
law systems. 
European integration generally, and the 1992 program in par-
ticular, will continue to alter significantly the legal profession, the 
substantive areas of member state regulation, and the traditional 
procedural steps of litigation. In the legal profession, formal 
barriers to broad practices are crumbling. In several substantive 
areas of law, new Community and member state regulation has 
changed the legal landscape, and will surely give rise to litigation 
over issues of competence, implementation, and interpretation. 
The creation of the Court of First Instance and new implications 
for forum selection, choice of law, enforcement, and arbitration 
all create new considerations for the international practitioner. 
Such profound developments mandate that parties involved in 
international business operations, and particularly in the negoti-
ation of contracts, must be careful in their anticipation of poten-
tial disputes and their eventual resolution. The complex structure 
of the Community's institutional and jurisdictional framework 
demands it all the more. 
128 Lecuyer, Thieffry and Thieffry, Negotiating Settlement of Dispute Provisions in Interna-
tional Business Contracts: Recent Developments in Arbitration and other Processes, 45 Bus. LAW 
577 (1990). 
